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Abstract:  
 
This paper investigates the speed of adjustment to target debt maturity for a sample of 
Malaysian firms based on the sample period of 2007 to 2016.  
 
We examine the impact of Sharia compliance on the speed of adjustment to target debt 
maturity structure by grouping companies based on nature of compliance to Sharia 
requirements which is categorised by the Securities Commission of Malaysia.  
 
In line with our expectations, the analysis shows that firms classified as Sharia compliant 
tend to adjust at more rapid rates to target debt maturity when below target levels suggesting 
that compliant firms are able to issue long-term debt at cheaper levels relative to non-
compliant counterparts. In addition, the reverse is observed when evaluating firms above 
target levels where non-compliant firms adjust at more rapid rates. 
 
Our findings indicate that compliant firms are able to raise long-term debt at cheaper rates 
relative to non-compliant firms given the captive market situation observed in the Islamic 
capital markets in Malaysia. This does however indicate the potential for higher agency 
costs as well as greater levels of information asymmetry for compliant firms relative to non-
compliant firms given that non-compliant firms are more willing to reduce maturity 
structures to reach target levels when above target levels.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose a framework of capital 
structure irrelevance which proposes that firm value is not affected by debt levels as 
well as debt maturity structures based on the perfect capital market assumptions. 
However, Morris (1976) provides an alternative based on similar assumptions where 
debt maturity has a direct influence on shareholders‘ wealth given that it has an 
impact on the risk exposure due to fluctuating interest rates.  
 
The literature provides several competing explanations of debt maturity structures 
ranging from the tax planning explanation (Lewis, 1990; Waluyo, 2018), a 
mechanism for reducing agency problems associated to moral hazards (Myers, 1977; 
Alias et al., 2017), an internal mechanism for singalling (Effendi and Disman, 2017; 
Slepov et al., 2017; Zainudin et al., 2017a) as well as a tool to manage firms‘ 
liquidity positions (Iqbal-Hussain et al., 2015; Arvanitis et al., 2017; Kamarudin et 
al., 2018).  
 
Looking into the empirical literature, we find that an overwhelming majority of 
managers‘ do have a target level for debt maturity structures when making security 
issue choices (Nor et al., 2011, Zainudin et al., 2017b). In addition, the literature 
further documents that firms that opt for shorter maturity structures would be more 
exposed to shocks at the macro level given that they would be forced to renegotiate 
debt terms more frequently (Jindrichovska, 2013; Custodio et al., 2013; Mallisa and 
Kusuma, 2017).  
 
Therefore, our main aim in this article is to analyze the rate of adjustment to target 
debt maturity levels for a sample of Malaysian firms. The sample selection of 
Malaysia provides a unique opportunity to test our notion given the capital market 
for Islamic and the conventional system runs on a parallel basis. In addition, 
Malaysia also has the largest Islamic capital market in the world. Thus our model 
tests the adjustment to target levels based on a set of control variables derived from 
the literature as well as seggregating the nature of compliance to Sharia 
requirements as evaluated by the Securities Commission of Malaysia (Ali et al., 
2018).  
 
2. Motivating the Study 
 
There are four main competing explanations which work in a dynamic manner to 
explain debt maturity choices (Ravid, 1996). The first view is based on the agency 
theory where by shorter maturities provides an alternative governance mechanism to 
reduce moral hazards as frequent renewal of borrowing terms tends to limit the 
underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977; Barclay et al., 2003; Almeida et al., 2012; 
Iqbal-Hussain et al., 2015). The tax explanation on the other hand proposes that 
firms prefer longer maturities in the event that the present value of interest tax 
shields are larger than issuing costs for constant renewal of short-term debt in the 
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long-term (Brick and Ravid, 1985; Brick and Ravid, 1991; Lewis, 1990; Guney and 
Iqbal-Hussain, 2010; Hussain et al., 2015a).  
 
The third view on maturity structures is derived from the liquidity needs of firms 
where managers are seen to be balancing the need for liquidity which is obtained via 
long-term borrowing versus improvement in credit ratings as a result of borrowing in 
the short-term (Brick and Liao, 2017; Shawtari et al., 2016; Al Shubri and Jamil, 
2017; Kamarudin et al., 2018). Finally, the signalling theory predicts that managers 
are further balancing the benefit arising  positive signal sent to the market by 
borrowing in the short terms versus the higher costs associated with frequent need to 
renew debt contracts (Iqbal-Hussain and Guney, 2011; Khaw and Lee, 2016; Pontoh, 
2017; Suryanto and Thalassinos, 2017; Suryanto et al., 2017).  
 
Each firm would thus be motivated to adjust to target debt maturity levels which 
motivates the jist of our empirical analysis (Barnea et al., 1980; Gonzalez, 2017; 
Hussain et al., 2018a). Our study uniquely studies the impact of Sharia compliance 
on firms target adjustment behaviour for differing maturity structures given that the 
literature documents compliance plays a role in maturity structures (Mohamed et al., 
2015; Thabet et al., 2017; Hussain et al., 2018b).  
 
2.1 Islamic Debt Markets: The Malaysian Context 
 
There are several explanations of firms borrowing levels. The trade-off view is based 
on managers constantly adjusting leverage levels in order to reach optimal (target) 
levels (Ali et al., 2018). However, the ability of managers to adjust to target levels is 
restricted due to market imperfections (Hussain et al., 2016a; Thalassinos et al., 
2015). Islamic views on debt on the other hand tends to restrict borrowing levels 
which could impede firms ability to adjust to target debt maturities (Setyawati, 2017; 
Iqbal-Hussain, 2017). This view is resonated on a global scale by international 
bodies such as the Dow Jones Islamic market, Accounting and Audit Organisation 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) based in Bahrain, as well as the 
Financial Times Stock exchange based in the UK (Rahman et al., 2010).  
 
In Malaysia, the borrowing of firms which are classified based on compliance to a 
set of restrictions as determined by the Securities Commission are referred to as 
Sharia compliance (Thabet et al., 2017). This is given that Islamic finance views 
usage of debt financing in a negative manner given that there are restrictions on 
interest based transactions (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Hassan and Aliyu, 2017; 
Hussain et al., 2018b). However the literature is critical on whether such nobel 
intentions have been overcome by secularism (Hassan and Sirajo, 2010; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2010).  
 
Firms which are able to raise long-term debt which are compliant or via ‘Sukuk’ 
issues would have the ability to adjust to target levels at more rapid rates (Mohamed 
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et al., 2015). In addition, the captive markets observed in Malaysia provide a unique 
opportunity to study the ability to adjust to target debt maturities given that it would 
alter the dynamics of the difference between costs of short-term versus long-term 
debt (Godlewski et al., 2013; Zulkhibri and Rani, 2016; Sherif and Erkol, 2017). 
Thus our study looks at the impact of Sharia compliance on the ability of firms to 
adjust to target debt maturities relative to their non-compliant counterparts (Hadi et 
al., 2018a; 2018b). 
 
3. Estimation Methods 
 
We utilise balance sheet figures in order to measure debt maturity which is defined 
as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (Mallisa and Kusuma, 2017; Hussain et 
al., 2018b).  
 
3.1 Control Variables 
 
In line with the literature, we include current debt levels (DEBT), size of the firm 
(FSIZE), potential future growth (MTB), the volatility of earnings (∆EAR), current 
levels of liquidity (LIQUID), firm earnings to indicate profitability (PROFIT), the 
performance of share prices (SHARE), maturity structure of assets (MATURITY) as 
well as the Z-SCORE to measure firms’ quality (ZSCORE) (Iqbal-Hussain, 2013; 
Hussain, 2014; Hussain et al., 2016b; Natocheeva et al., 2017). Definition of  control 
variables are provided in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1. Control variables and their definitions 
Variable Definition 
Debt Levels (DEBT) 
Total debt scaled by total debt plus MV of equity and BV of 
preference shares 
Size of the Firm 
(FSIZE) 
Natural logarithm of assets 
Potential Future 
Growth (MTB) 
Total assets minus book value of equity plus MV of equity 
scaled by total assets 
Volatility of Earnings 
(∆EAR) 
Absolute value of {[EBITt - EBITt-1]/EBITt-1} minus average of 
{[EBITt - EBITt-1]/EBITt-1} 
Current level of 
liquidity (LIQUID) 
Current assets scaled by current liabilities 
Firms Earnings 
(PROFIT) 
EBIT scaled by total assets 
Performance of Share 
Prices (SHARE) 
Changes in share price 
Maturity Structure of 
Assets (MATURITY) 
Total fixed assets scaled by total assets 
Quality of the Firm 
(ZSCORE) 
Altman's Z-score 
Note: Table above provides control variables and their respective defintiions.. All variables 
are adopted from Hussain et al., 2018.  
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3.2 Target Debt Maturity and the Speed of Adjustment 
 
In order to estimate the speed of adjustment to target debt maturity, we initially 
estimate the target levels which is measured based on the fitted values of estimations 
in the lead time (t+1). The estimation is done based on a static approach as well as 
dynamic approach (Fama and French, 2002; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The dynamic 
model includes a lagged regressor which allows to control for endogeneity concerns 
potentially arising as well as tackle any bias of panel data estimation methods. All 
regressions include 14 industry dummies as reported in Appendix 1. The static 
model is expressed as follows: 
 
 
     (1) 
 
The dynamic model on the other hand based on the auto-regressive version is 
expressed as follows (Ju et al., 2005): 
 
 
 
                                                                     (2) 
 
3.3 Explanatory Variables and Shari’ah Compliance 
 
In order to estimate the impact of Shari’ah compliance as discussed in the motivation 
section above, we utilse the first difference at (t+1) and (t). This is termed as the 
GAP variable which documents the difference between the actual values at (t+1) and 
(t). The dependent variable is the difference between fitted values from regressing 
model (1) and (2) above at (t+1) versus actual data at (t). The model is thus 
expressed as follows (Hovakimian and Li, 2010; Hovakimian and Li 2011, Warr et 
al., 2012): 
 
 
                                                                       (3) 
The coefficient  captures the amount debt maturity levels must change in order for 
firms to reach optimal (target) levels (Hussain et al., 2017a). Theoretical predictions 
from the trade-off theory posit that if firms do not adjust to target levels, then the 
coefficient would be insignificant (i.e. zero) (Orman and Koksal, 2017; Hussain et 
al., 2017b). However, in perfect capital markets firms would be able to adjust 
completely and thus lead to a unity in the coefficient . Given market 
imperfections, we expect the value to be in between. In addition, we further split the 
sample into firms which are below optimal debt maturity levels as well as above 
debt maturity levels. Thus firms whose maturity structures are above optimal levels 
would have a negative GAP and vice-versa. In order to evaluate the impact of 
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compliance to Shari’ah requirements, we interact the GAP variable with a Shari’ah 
compliance dummy (SCD) which takes the value of 1 if firms are categorised as 
compliance by the Securities Commission of Malaysia and zero otherwise for firms 
below optimal levels. For firms above optimal levels the interaction term is switched 
to a non-compliance dummy (NSCD). The model is thus expressed as follows: 
 
 
                                                                       (4) 
 
4. Sample Selection 
 
We utilise an unbalanced panel data sample for all firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia for the period of 2007 – 2016. In line with the standard practise of studies 
in capital structure, we eliminate financial firms from our sample (Thabet et al., 
2017). Furthermore, due to the dynamic panel data method utilised, we introduce a 
requirement of minimum three-years of continuous observations. In addition, 
missing observations are also dropped from the sample. Our final sampel consists of 
638 firms with 5,856 firm-year observations for the period of 2007 to 2016. The 
sample structure is unbalanced panel data in order to capture efficiency gains as well 
as reduction of bias in omitted variables (Guney and Iqbal-Hussain, 2009; Iqbal-
Hussain et al., 2015; Hussain, 2016c). 
  
Table 2. Differentiating mean values for Shari’ah compliant versus non-compliant 
firms  
Variables Shari’ah Compliant Firms Non-compliant Firms 
DM 0.3368 0.2582 
(t-stat) (5.6802)*** 
DEBT 0.1824 0.3318 
(t-stat) (3.9602)*** 
FSIZE 16.7823 21.0891 
(t-stat) (1.9928)** 
MTB 2.2386 1.6902 
(t-stat) (2.9804)*** 
∆EAR 2.2408 3.2891 
(t-stat) (4.5806)*** 
LIQUID 1.9022 1.4882 
(t-stat) (3.6308)*** 
PROFIT 0.08241 0.0893 
(t-stat) (1.2455) 
SHARE 0.1528 0.1482 
(t-stat) (0.9826) 
MATURITY 0.3428 0.3628 
(t-stat) (1.1081) 
Z-SCORE 1.9082 1.8632 
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(t-stat) (0.6902) 
Note: Table above provides mean comparison of both categories of firms. Significance 
levels of difference are denoted as ***,** and ** for 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
We present mean value of the firm specific determinants which act as control 
variables in our study in table 2 above. The two columns provide a basis for 
comparing the values for Shari’ah compliant versus non-compliant companies. Our 
comparison indicates that compliant firms tend to have longer maturity structure, i.e. 
heavier reliance on long-term debt. Total leverage for compliant firms are however 
lower suggesting that the motivation to borrow differs for non-compliant firms. 
Shari’ah compliant firms are also smaller, have more growth opportunities, less 
volatile earnings and have higher levels of liquidity. Profitability, share price 
performance as well as asset maturity structures do not differ for both categories of 
firms.  
5. Findings 
 
The results for regressing equation (1) and (2) are presented in table 3 below. We 
report coefficients and t-values of the results based on the time series approach in 
Fama and French (2002) for the first column. The second column reports the 
dynamic model which utilises robust standard errors whilst controlling for the bias 
introduced by panel data with short observation periods with many firms (White, 
1980; Windmeijer, 2005).  
Table 3. Modelling target debt maturity levels at lead time(t+1) 
Variables Fama and French approach Blundell and Bond approach 
Constant 0.1982*** - 
(t-stat) (4.2804) - 
Lagged DM - 0.4506*** 
(t-stat) - (10.2909) 
DEBT 0.3244*** 0.1928*** 
(t-stat) (2.9602) (3.0891) 
FSIZE 0.1092*** 0.0369** 
(t-stat) (3.5422) (2.3808) 
MTB 0.0472 0.0001 
(t-stat) (0.9801) (0.0098) 
∆EAR 0.0102 0.0005 
(t-stat) (1.2321) (0.0129) 
LIQUID 0.0691*** 0.0925*** 
(t-stat) (3.8921) (4.2891) 
PROFIT 0.3582*** 0.1020 
(t-stat) (6.8231) (1.3081) 
SHARE 0.0205 0.0086 
(t-stat) (1.4220) (0.0506) 
MATURITY 0.3281*** 0.0624 
(t-stat) (6.8902) (1.5320) 
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Z-SCORE 0.0002 0.0001 
(t-stat) (0.0368) (0.0092) 
Average R2 0.3206 - 
F-Test (p-
values) 0.00 - 
Adjusted R2 - 0.5256 
AR (1) - -5.5690*** 
AR (2) - 0.9691 
Wald Test  
(p-values) - 0.00 
Sargan Test  
(p-values) - 0.18 
Observations 5,856 5,856 
Note: Table above provides basis for fitted model. Figures are reported for coefficients 
whilst t-values are reported in paranthesis. Column 1 is based on the static approach 
whereas column 2 is based on the dynamic appraoch. Significance levels of difference are 
denoted as *,** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The lagged dependent variable is significant in the second column suggesting that 
firms do indeed adjust to target debt maturity levels. The diagnostics of the 2-step 
sytem GMM employed to estimate target debt maturity levels are also within 
expectations based on the figures reported for AR 1, AR 2, Wald test as well as 
Sargan test.  
 
We utilise the fitted values from both columns to measure the  which forms 
part of the dependent variable in equation (3) and (4). The results for both are 
reported in table  4 below for both the static approach (fitted values from column 1 
in table 3) as well as the dynamic approach (fitted values from column 2 in table 3). 
The table reports coefficients as well as t-statsitics which are measured based on 
standard errors clustered on year as well as firm levels (Petersen, 2009). This 
represents major econometric gains relative to Rogers (1993) or White (1980) 
standard errors.  
 
Motivated by our empirical priors, we split the sample to firms which have a 
negative GAP (below target levels) as well as a p GAP (above target levels). 
Columns 3 and 5 are based on the static approach whilst columns 4 and 6 are based 
on the dynamic approach.  
 
Table 4. Speed of Adjustment to Target Debt Maturity Levels based on the GAP 
Measure 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
      Firms with negative GAP Firms with positive GAP 
GAP 
0.3508*
** 
0.5103*
** 
- - - - 
(4.8502) (5.6530) - - - - 
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GAP x 
SCD 
- - 0.2908*** 
0.3244*
** 
- - 
- - (3.8956) (3.9828) - - 
GAP x 
NSCD 
- - - - 0.4682*** 
0.6244*
** 
- - - - (4.2488) (5.6328) 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.3624 0.4088 0.2891 0.3406 0.4325 0.4826 
Wald  
(p-values) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observatio
ns  
5,856 5,856 2,863 3,204 2,953 2,508 
Period 2007 – 2016 
Note: Table above provides the rate at which firms close the gap in order to adjust to 
target debt maturity levels. Figures are reported for coefficients whilst t-values are 
reported in paranthesis. Column 1, 3 and 5 are based on the static approach whereas 
columns 2, 4 and 6 are based on the dynamic appraoch. Significance levels of difference 
are denoted as *,** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The results for the interaction term for the positive GAP is significant indicating that 
Shari’ah compliant firms are able to adjust at more rapid levels. This indicates that 
the cost of issuing long-term debt is lower for compliant firms. Our findings to 
however indicate that non-compliant firms would be more inclined to maintain 
short-term debt in order to reduce agency costs, suggesting the potential for greater 
agency costs in Shari’ah compliant firms (Hussain et al., 2015b). In addition, greater 
reliance on long-term debt reduces the frequency for renegotiation of contracts 
which leads to potentially greater levels of information asymmetry for compliant 
firms relative to their non-compliant counterparts. Looking at the results in columns 
5 and 6, the interaction term for negative GAP with the non-compliant dummy is 
also significant. This indicates that non-compliant firms are more likely to adjust to 
taget levels by reducing debt maturity structures. The indication from this results 
could suggest that compliant firms tend to have higher bankruptcy costs and thus 
would be inclined to preserve financial slack. In addition, compliant firms tend to 
have more tangible asset structures. Furthemore, managers of Sharia compliant firms 
would be reluctant to opt for short-term borrowing as a precaution in order to better 
manage liquidity risks as well as reduce the likelihood of cash shortages.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our study evaluates the adjustment to target debt maturity for a sample of Malaysian 
firms based on the unbalanced panel data approach. We distinguish adjustment 
behavior based on the nature of compliance to Sharia requirements as determined by 
the Securities Commission of Malaysia. Our results allow us to draw several 
interesting inferences from the empirical tests. We find that managers of Malaysian 
firms tend to adjust at different rates depending on the nature of compliance. The 
findings indicate that compliant firms with a positive GAP are able to adjust at more 
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rapid rates to target maturity structures by increasing reliance on long-term debt. Our 
findings point towards a lower cost structure for compliant firms when issuing long-
term debt which however does indicate the tendency for greater agency problems. In 
addition, the findings do point that managers of compliant firms are unable to reduce 
information asymmetry levels relative to their non-compliant counterparts. For firms 
with negative GAP, non-compliant firms tend to reduce maturity structures by 
opting for short-term debt. This does paint a positive picture where compliant firms 
tend to have lower bankruptcy costs. In addition, managers of compliant firms are 
also more concerned with liquidity management issues.  
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Appendix A: Classification of Industry Dummies 
 
Number  Industry name 
1   Automotive, Aviation and transportation 
2   Beverages, Tobacco 
3   Building and Construction 
4   Chemicals, Healthcare, Pharmaceuticals 
5   Computer, Electrical and electronic equipment 
6   Diversified industry 
7   Engineering, Mining, Metallurgy, Oil and gas exploration 
8   Food producer and processors, Farming and fishing 
9   Leisure, Hotels, restaurants and pubs 
10   Other business 
11   Paper, Forestry, Packaging, Printing and publishing, Photography 
12   Retailers, Wholesalers and distributors 
13   Services 
14   Textile, Leather, Clothing, Footwear and furniture 
15   Utilities 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
